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LIMITS OF TITLE SEARCH UNDER THE WEST VIRGINIA
RECORDING ACT
CLYDE L. COLSON*
T HERE is a serious question whether the limited search
customarily made by title examiners in West Virginia is a
safe one, both with respect to the interests of the prospective
purchaser, and also with respect to the possible liability of the
examiner for having negligently failed to discover recorded instru-
ments which are or may be a cloud on title. Everyone is agreed
that there must be a search of the records from the date each
grantor in the chain of title acquired his title down to the date
when it appears that by an instrument of record he has transferred
the title. The difference of opinion centers around the question
whether it is necessary to carry on the search in the name of a
grantor after he appears to have conveyed record title. In actual
practice no such additional search is made and the lawyers of the
state seem to be of almost unanimous opinion that no such search
is necessary. An attempt will be made in this article to show that
the customary practice is not safe, at least so long as the question
remains undecided in West Virginia. In this connection we shall
so far as possible avoid discussions of what the law should be. We
are more interested in trying to determine what the law is under
our statutes and decisions, and what risks a title examiner may
be taking under the present West Virginia practice, when he
ignores certain questions which so far as we have been able to
discover are still unanswered in this state.
In an effort to present the problem in its simplest form, we
shall confine our discussion to situations in which there are suc-
cessive deeds by the same grantor, each purporting to convey the
title in fee simple. It will also be assumed, unless the contrary is
stated, that the second grantee was a subsequent purchaser for
value, the only question to be considered being whether he was a
purchaser with or without notice of prior rights. It should be kept
in mind, however, that the identical problem is presented when
the grantor executes successive instruments of any kind which are
recordable under our statute. In thus limiting our discussion to
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
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the rights of successive purchasers, we are not unmindful of the
problems concerning the rights of creditors under the recording
acts, which in West Virginia is an entirely different question.
The problem in its simplest form is presented by the following
supposed set of facts with respect to the title of Blackacre:
1940-A by deed of record acquired title in fee.
1941-A conveyed to B who failed to record his deed.
1942-A conveyed to C who had actual notice of B's unrecorded
deed. C recorded his deed immediately.
1943-B recorded his deed.
1944-C conveyed to D who had no actual notice of the deed
to B.
In this situation who has title to Blackacre, B or D? Is D a bona
fide purchaser entitled to protection under our recording act, or
does the fact that B's prior deed from A was on record at the time
D bought from C deprive D of such protection? In other words
does D have record notice of B's rights?
This question is an open one in West Virginia and in probably
more than half the other states, but in a majority of those jurisdic-
tions where the question has been decided it is held that D is not
a bona fide purchaser because of the constructive notice afforded
him by the record of B's deed. Unless and until our court decides
that D does not have constructive notice of B's deed, a lawyer cannot
on the basis of the title search ordinarily made in this state assure
D, the prospective purchaser, that he will acquire good title from C.
This would mean, then, that both for the protection of his client, D,
and for his own protection, he should continue his search in the
grantor index under the name of A from 1942, when A apparently
transferred his record title, right on down to the date of the title
search. Otherwise he could never be sure that a possible prior
deed had not subsequently been placed on record. A similar
search would of course have to be made with respect to every other
grantor appearing in the chain of title. The answer to the question
whether such an extensive search is required will necessarily depend
upon the proper interpretation of our recording act.
General discussions found in most textbooks and decisions
concerning the effect and operation of American recording acts
will be of little help in our effort to solve this problem. It is
doubtful whether any other field of the law contains so many
erroneous generalizations and reflects such confusion of thought
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concerning a problem as important as the one under discussion.
The confusion stems primarily from a failure to appreciate the
fact that recording statutes are of three distinct types, each differing
materially from the other two in operation and effect. However
possible it may be to generalize with respect to any particular type
of statute, it seems clear that with few relatively unimportant ex-
ceptions, only error and confusion can follow any effort to state
general rules applicable to all three. That will explain why this
article contains so few citations. It is believed that a bit of a priori
reasoning will be more profitable. This belief is held nonetheless
firmly, in spite of the fact that there is now abroad in the land,
particularly in West Virginia, the heresy (with some of which there
can be no disagreement) that law professors, as a result of their
too-long sojourn in the ivory tower, are dispensing mostly theory
which will be of relatively little practical use to their students after
graduation, and that they would be doing a better job if they
devoted more time to matters of practical or "bread and butter"
importance, which is by hypothesis impossible for most of them
because of their lack of practical experience. It just may be that
this article deals with a problem concerning which the practicing
lawyer may obtain worthwhile practical advice from a purely
theoretical discussion.
Fortunately, a few of the better authorities who have con-
sidered the operation and effect of recording statutes can be of
material help in our effort to find a clear path through the mass of
irreconcilable statements and decisions in this field. They have
recognized that the key to the problem lies in a clear understanding
of the differences in the recording statutes. On the basis of the
type of recording statute in each state, Patton classifies American
jurisdictions into three groups, each of which we must examine
in some detail: (1) Pure race jurisdictions, (2) Pure notice juris-
dictions, and (3) Notice-race jurisdictions.
Pure Race Jurisdictions. Under the recording acts of a very
small minority of American jurisdictions, priority of right is madc
entirely dependent upon priority of record, without any regard
to notice or lack of notice. If the case stated above should arise
in a jurisdiction having this type of statute, C's right is clearly
superior to that of B, simply because C won the race to the record
office, and this despite the fact that C took the deed with actual
notice that A had given a prior deed to B. In other words in a
3
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pure race jurisdiction priority of right depends upon the winning
of the race to the recording office. 1
Pure Notice Jurisdictions. Approximately two-thirds of the
states have recording acts under which priority is dependent, not
upon a race to the registry, but upon whether at the time a person
became a purchaser he had notice of the rights of a prior grantee. 2
Notice-Race Jurisdictions. In approximately one-third of the
states, in order to obtain priority over the grantee under a prior
unrecorded deed, a purchaser must not only take his conveyance
without notice of the rights of the prior grantee, but he must also
win the race to the registry, placing his deed on record before the
prior deed is recorded.3
On the basis of discussions with numerous West Virginia
lawyers, there seems to be a wide diversity of opinion as to which
type of recording statute we have in this state. Some argue that
our statute is of the first type under which the only question is
priority of record. Many others argue that ours is of the third type
under which, as between purchasers without actual notice, priority
of right will depend upon priority of recording. According to
Patton, however, who seems to have made the most thorough study
of the recording acts in the various states, West Virginia is classed
among those states having recording statutes of the pure notice
type.4 Such specific discussion of the problem as may be found in
our cases would seem to indicate that Patton is correct, despite some
dicta to the contrary and despite the opinion held by a substantial
number of West Virginia lawyers that ours is a notice-race statute.
It is no wonder that such a difference of opinion exists because
countless statements can be found in supposed authorities on the
subject, stating without qualification that as a general rule priority
of right depends upon priority of record, for which proposition
cases from either pure race or notice-race jurisdictions are cited
indiscriminately. 5 Statutes of both these types are in the minority,
however, and cases from such jurisdictions are not even in point
I PATrON, LAND TiTms § 8 (1938).
21d. § 9.
3id. § 10.
41d. § 9 n.105.
5 For example, see I JONES, MORTGAGEs § 570 at 755 (8th ed. 1928), where it
is said: "The order of priority between persons claiming liens on the same
property, by mortgage or otherwise, is fixed by the order in which they are filed
for record. In other words, priority of record gives priority of title, as a general
rule .. "
4
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on the question of the operation of recording acts in states which
have a pure notice statute. The conclusion that in the normal
situation ours is a pure notice statute, priority of right being in
no way dependent upon priority of record, is borne out by the
fact that with respect to one particular case we have a statute which
does give priority to the first recorded deed. This is the statute
dealing with the situation in which both deeds are recorded on the
same day. If priority as between these deeds is not covered by
other provisions of the statute, it is provided that priority shall
be given to the deed first recorded.0 The implication is clear that
with respect to deeds recorded on different days the result under
the normal rule may well be otherwise. If in every case priority
of right is dependent upon priority of record, it would be entirely
pointless for the legislature to provide this rule with respect to
deeds recorded on the same day.
As between two successive grantees from the same grantor,
it is abundantly clear from the West Virginia cases that priority
depends not upon priority of recording but solely upon whether
the second grantee at the time he became a purchaser had actual
or constructive notice of the prior conveyance.7  Of course he had
such notice if the deed was recorded at the time the second con-
veyance was made, and even though it was unrecorded the second
grantee may or may not have had notice thereof. As between the
two purchasers, priority depends entirely upon this matter of
notice. A later recording of the first deed in a pure notice juris-
6 W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1, § 13 (Michie; 1949).
7 See Alexander v. Andrews, 135 W. Va. 403, 64 S.E.2d 487 (1951), in which
at p. 407 our court said: "But our recording Act, Code, 40-1-9, makes a perfectly
valid and effective conveyance void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice, until such deed is duly admitted to
record in the county wherein the property conveyed is situated; and, therefore,
while the grantor has nothing to convey, when he executes a subsequent deed
for the same property, to a different party, then by force of this statute, his
grantee in the subsequent deed gets title to the land in cases where the grantee
in the first deed fails to record his deed before the second deed is executed,
and where the grantee in the second deed can qualify as a purchaser for value
and without notice of the first deed." (Italics supplied.) Note that this case
involved a contest between C and B which B won. Although C had no notice
of B's unrecorded deed at the time he obtained and recorded his deed, he
received constructive notice thereof when B recorded before C had completed
payment of the full purchase price. Had the case involved the additional
fact of a conveyance from C to D, a purchaser without actual notice of B's
deed in spite of the fact that it was on the record, it would have presented the
very problem we are trying to solve. Should this case arise it seems clear that
our court would have to charge D with constructive notice of B's deed, unless il
wished to deprive B of the victory he won in the actual case.
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diction can in no way deprive the second grantee of the priority
he had already achieved. The point we are trying to make will
probably be clear if we first review the situation as it existed at
common law in the absence of any recording statute. We shall
then consider the extent to which the rights of the parties were
changed by the recording statutes, and the theory upon which
such change in priority was brought about.
At common law, if A first conveyed land to B and later con-
veyed the same land to C, the problem was easy. B had priority
for the simple reason that after the conveyance to him A had
nothing left to convey to C. Whether C did or did not have notice
of the prior conveyance had nothing to do with the case. "Prior
in time, prior in right." B won for no other reason than that he
obtained the first deed. In a way it is too bad that the problem
is not still that simple.
As a matter of fact, the solution was equally easy under the
original registry or recording acts, the material and only dif-
ference being that the common-law rule was changed so that
priority of right was made to depend upon priority of record rather
than upon priority of conveyance. Such statutes were of the pure
race type. It may well be that the operation of such a statute as
originally conceived would prevent the first conveyance from being
effective until B recorded.$ Title presumably remained in A until
B placed his deed on record, such recording being necessary to make
the deed effective even as between grantor and grantee. But
whatever may have been the original idea, it soon became the
accepted view that under any type of recording act B, the first
grantee, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary,
acquired the legal title from A just as he would have at common
law, but that in order to maintain his common-law priority as
against a subsequent transferee within the protection of the act
he had to place his deed on record.
Under a pure race statute, this means that in order to main-
tain his common-law priority as against a subsequent purchaser,
whether with or without notice, B must record his deed before the
second deed is recorded. From B's point of view this is the most
stringent requirement of all recording acts. Under a pure notice
statute, in order to maintain his common-law priority as against
8 PATrON, LAND TiTLEs § 8 at p. 36, where it is said that pure race statutes
"follow more nearly the original idea that registry should be the final act in
the process of transferring title .. "
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a subsequent purchaser without notice, B must record first. Stated
another way, this means that in order to assure himself that there
cannot possibly be a subsequent purchaser without notice, B must
record his deed immediately upon its receipt. On the other hand,
it is clear that under a pure notice statute B has priority as against
a subsequent purchaser with notice, whether he records first, or
second, or for that matter whether he ever records. Under a
notice-race statute, the requirement from B's point of view is less
burdensome than under a pure notice statute. Even as against
a subsequent purchaser without notice, it is only necessary for B
to place his prior deed on record before the second deed is recorded,
though it was unrecorded at the time C became a purchaser.
Probably the best explanation of the result reached under all
three types of statute is the power theory, so clearly set forth in
one of Aigler's articles.9 According to this theory, even though A
has transferred all his title to B there remains in A, until B's deed
is recorded, the legal power to vest title in a subsequent grantee who
is within the protection of the recording act. Again, for purposes
of clarity, let us examine the extent of A's power under each type
of statute. Under a pure race statute, A has power to vest title
in a subsequent purchaser, whether with or without notice of B's
rights, who records his deed before B's deed is placed on record.
Under a pure notice statute A has power to vest title in a subse-
quent purchaser who, at the time he receives his conveyance, has
no actual or constructive notice of B's prior rights. Under a
notice-race statute A's power may also be exercised only in favor
of a subsequent purchaser without notice of B's prior rights, but
even so any attempted exercise of the power will be ineffective
unless the second grantee outruns B to the record office.
Viewed from B's position this means that in order to deprive
A of this power, or in other words, in order to maintain his
common-law priority, B must place his deed on record as soon as
possible. If B acts promptly, which he must do in order to protect
himself against all contingencies, he is given priority not because
his recorded deed gives subsequent purchasers notice of his rights,
but because by recording his deed he has deprived A of the power
he would otherwise have to divest B's title in favor of someone
within the protection of the recording statute. It must nevertheless
be emphasized that lack of notice is important in all jurisdictions
9 Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mim. L. REv. 405 (1924).
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except those having a pure race statute. The mere fact that a
deed is properly on record will prevent any subsequent purchaser
from being a purchaser without notice. For any lawyer who
represents a prospective purchaser, it therefore becomes very im-
portant to know what recorded deeds will be considered as giving
his client record notice of the rights of the grantee under the
recorded deed. Obviously, if a particular deed even though re-
corded does not give notice, there is no reason for concern on
this score. On the other hand, if a particular deed which is in
fact on record is held to give constructive notice, then the lawyer
must in fairness to his client make whatever search may be neces-
sary in order to discover the recorded deed. Necessarily then the
limits of the title examination which a lawyer should make in a
pure notice jurisdiction must in the very nature of things depend
upon what recorded deeds do or do not give record notice. We shall
see later that the problem is more complicated in a notice-race
jurisdiction.
As a guide to the lawyer in fixing the limits of his search, little
help can be derived from the statement often made that since
only deeds in the chain of title give constructive notice, it is
unnecessary to look for deeds not in the chain of title. That
would be fine and good if the phrase "chain of title" had any
definite, accepted meaning. As a matter of fact, the phrase is
used more often as a means of explaining the result than as an aid
in deciding any particular question. Obviously if the court deter-
mines that a particular deed gives no notice in spite of the fact
that it is on record, an easy explanation is to say that the deed is
not in the chain of title. On the other hand if the court feels that
the deed should be held to give constructive notice, it will simply
say that a subsequent purchaser has notice because the recorded
deed is in the chain of title.
This is not to say that the concept of a chain of title is not of
material help in many situations. What is meant is that in the
difficult cases where help is needed it is of little value. In the
normal case there will be a continuous and unbroken chain of
conveyances, starting with the original valid patent and coming
on down through successive grantors to the present owner, from
whom your client proposes to purchase the land. A search of the
grantor index under the name of each successive owner, from the
date he acquired title down to the date when he appears by a
8
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recorded deed to have conveyed title to the next owner, will
ordinarily bring to light all instruments which might constitute
a cloud on the title of the prospective vendor. The fact that this
is nearly always the case probably explains why the average lawyer
confines his search to this limited period. Our problem, however,
is whether this fact also constitutes a justification for the normal
practice, or whether a more extensive search should be made in
order to guard against the complications discussed in this article.
The oft-stated proposition that "a recorded deed not in the
chain of title gives no notice" may help us solve as well as
explain those cases in which the deed is clearly outside the chain.
For example, if a prospective vendor, D, whose title is under exam-
ination, is the last grantee in an unbroken chain running from the
state through A, B, and C down to D, it is obvious that a purchaser
from D cannot be charged with notice of a deed of the same land
executed by a grantor, X, who is a complete stranger to the title
under which the purchaser would claim, even though X's deed had
been placed on record. Except in states where the Torren's system
of recording is in effect, there would be no earthly way to find
this deed from X unless the title examiner looked at every deed
on record. The same problem in modified form is presented by
another situation. Suppose that A, who has title, conveys to B. B
never records his deed but conveys title to C who places his deed
on record. Obviously a subsequent purchaser from A would have
no practicable way to discover this deed from B to C, even though
it is recorded. So far as is known, no court would place upon
the purchaser, or upon his lawyer, the unreasonable requirement
of examining every recorded deed in order to determine whether
such a transaction had occurred. This test of the reasonableness
of the search that may or should be required should be kept in
mind for its possible bearing upon the answer to our main problem.
The matters just dealt with are expressly covered by the West
Virginia statute which provides that a purchaser shall not be
affected "by the record of a deed or contract made by a person
under whom his title is not derived. ..-'
It is easy enough to see that a purchaser should not be
charged with notice of a recorded deed from a grantor who is in
no way connected with the chain of title under which the purchaser
claims. The crux of our problem, however, is this: Assuming
lo W. VA. CODE c. 40, art. 1, § 15 (Michie, 1949).
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that a particular grantor is in the chain of title under examination,
is a prospective purchaser charged with notice of all possible
recorded transfers made by this particular grantor at any time, or
is he charged with notice only of such instruments as were made
and recorded in a more limited period, as for example, from the
date when the grantor first acquired title down to the date when
by the record he first appears to have transferred his title? This
limited period is of course the only period covered by the title
examination customarily made.
For the sake of convenience in discussing the problem, let us
consider the different times when a deed from a particular grantor,
A, may have been placed on the record. There are three more or
less distinct periods involved:
(1) The period before A had any title.
(2) The period during which A was the record owner.
(3) The period after A apparently ceased to be the record
owner.
Surprising as it may seem, the rule in some states requires that
a search of the records be made backward indefinitely under the
name of each grantor, for any recorded deed he may have given at
any time before he became the owner of record. Assume, for
example, that at a time when A has the title, B by warranty deed
conveys the land to C, who immediately places his deed on record.
Thereafter A conveys to B. If we stop right here, in many states
B's after-acquired title will under the doctrine of estoppel by deed
immediately feed the prior deed to C, so that legal title becomes
vested in C. Suppose, however, that after B gets his deed from A
he records it, so that he appears to have record title. If B then
conveys to D, a purchaser without actual notice of C's rights, we
are faced with the question whether D takes with constructive
notice of the prior recorded deed from B to C, under which C ac-
quired title by estoppel. Under the rule adopted in some states C has
priority over D, and in such a jurisdiction D's lawyer would have to
search the record for the prior deed that was executed by B and re-
corded by C when B had neither actual nor record title. In a majori-
ty of jurisdictions, however, the view is taken that although as be-
tween B and C the doctrine of estoppel by deed will vest title in C,
the doctrine will not be applied as between C and a subsequent pur-
chaser from B, the apparent record owner, if such purchaser took
without actual notice of C's rights. Under this view the prior deed
10
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from B to C even though on record does not give constructive
notice, and therefore in such a jurisdiction the title examiner
employed by a prospective purchaser from B is under no necessity
to search the records for such a deed."
Fortunately for West Virginia lawyers it is clear that no search
need be made for such a deed recorded during this first period
before B acquired title. Our statute adopting the majority rule
stated above provides that a purchaser shall not be affected "by the
record of a deed or contract made by any person under whom the
title of such purchaser is derived, if it was made by such person,
and was recorded, before he acquired the legal title. '" 12
Note well, however, that although the dividing line between
the first and second periods suggested above may be clear in fact,
it is nevertheless a possible source of confusion. The line is drawn
not at the date B recorded his deed from A, but goes back to
the date of the deed itself. Consequently, even in West Virginia
under our statute, and in other states which follow the majority
rule, a limited search must be made prior to the date when B
became the record owner for possible deeds that may have been
executed by B before he had any title but were recorded after the
date on which B acquired title from A.1
3
Aside from this possible confusion as to when the period
begins, there is no problem so far as the second period is concerned.
Everybody is agreed that a search must be made, under the name of
each successive grantor, for incumbrances and other clouds on title
that may have been created by any instrument executed by him
that was placed on record after the date on which he acquired title,
but before the date on which by a recorded instrument he apparent-
ly transferred title to the next grantor.
Our real trouble is with respect to the third period, between
the date on which each grantor in the chain of title apparently
disposed of his record title and the date on which the title search
is being made. Of course, if the matter is judged on the basis of
the practice almost universally followed by title examiners, there
is no real problem here either, because one simply does not search
that part of the record. Our main question, however, is whether
11 PATTON, LAND TrT.Es § 45.
12 W. VA. CODE C. 40, art. 1, § 15 (Michie, 1949).
13 PATTON, LAND TITh.ES § 45 n.75 where it is said: "The rule requires,
however, that a subsequent purchaser examine back to the date of the deed
to his grantor, and not merely to the date on which it was recorded."
11
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a lawyer may with safety fail to make this additiofal search, how-
ever burdensome it may be.
Keeping in mind the general observations made thus far, let
us return to the problem presented at the beginning of this article,
The facts were these:
1940-A by deed of record acquired title in fee.
1941-A conveyed to B who failed to record his deed.
1942-A conveyed to C who had actual notice of B's unrecorded
deed. C recorded his deed immediately.
1943-B recorded his deed.
1944-C conveyed to D who had no actual notice of the deed
to B.
The question is, did D acquire good title when he bought from
C in 1944?
No universally correct answer to this question can be made.
In the first place we must know what type of recording statute was
in effect in the jurisdiction where the transaction occurred. In a
pure race jurisdiction D obviously has priority over B. Although
at the time of his purchase C had notice of B's prior unrecorded
deed, he nevertheless won his race with B to the record office. As
soon as C's deed was placed on record, B's rights were completely
and irrevocably divested. Therefore C had good title which he
could and did convey to D in 1944. Thus in a pure race jurisdic-
tion the general practice of title examiners is entirely safe, if the
jurisdiction also follows the majority rule with respect to the
problem of estoppel by deed, rendering unnecessary a search for
deeds given by a grantor before he acquired title.
Most of the controversy concerning this problem has centered
around the question whether D has notice of B's rights merely by
reason of the fact that B's deed was on record at the time D
bought from C. Obviously, this question of notice can arise in
either a pure notice jurisdiction or in a notice-race jurisdiction,
but for reasons to be stated later, it is extremely doubtful whether
the question is of any real importance in a notice-race jurisdiction.
We will, however, overlook that matter for the time being. Getting
back to our main problem, the legal title which B acquired in
1941 was not divested by the 1942 conveyance from A to C, because
C took with actual notice of B's unrecorded deed. The fact that C
recorded his deed first in no way affected B's title for the simple rea-
son that there is nothing in either a pure notice statute or in a notice-
12
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race statute that gives protection to a purchaser with notice. There-
fore title was still in B at the time he recorded his deed in 1943.
Now we come to the heart of the matter. When D became a sub-
sequent purchaser of the land in 1944 did he or did he not have
record notice of B's actual legal title, as evidenced by B's recorded
deed? Although this question has arisen in relatively few jurisdic-
tions, a majority of the courts that have directly decided the
question hold that D does have constructive notice of B's rights.14
Philbrick among others has severely criticized this view.15
According to Philbrick, the area of the required title search
should be limited by the reasonableness of the requirement. Only
those recorded instruments which a title examiner may reasonably
be required to look for should be held to give record notice.
Starting from the premise that it is wholly unreasonable to require
the title examiner to search down to date under the name of each
grantor appearing in the chain of title, for possible clouds on title
that may have been created by recorded instruments from each
grantor, he concludes that the deed to B, recorded in 1943, should
not constitute record notice to D, a purchaser who subsequently
buys the land from C. He cites the almost universal practice of
title lawyers as evidence of the unreasonableness of the majority
rule, under which it is necessary for the title examiner to look for
B's deed. Presumably most lawyers are reasonable men who do
all that they feel is reasonably necessary.
Conceding the weight and relevance of these arguments in any
jurisdiction in which the question remains open, it should again
be pointed out that the lawyer is running a substantial risk when
he proceeds on the assumption that should the question ever arise,
his court would find these arguments convincing. Furthermore,
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the search here involved
is purely and simply a question of the amount of time and work
which should be required of the lawyer. If he looks far enough
under A's name in the grantor index, he can easily enough find
this deed to B. It could even be said that Philbrick's argument
boils itself down to this-that it is unreasonable to make a lawyer
work so hard. Although it is only a matter of degree, note how
this situation differs from the case where a recorded deed entirely
14 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1269 (Sd ed. 1959).
15 Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 125, 259, 391 (1944-45). This was by all odds the most helpful and best
article found dealing with the general subject of recording acts.
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disconnected from the chain of title under examination is generally
held not to give constructive notice, and this on the ground that it
would be unreasonable to expect a lawyer to find that deed, there
being no possible way to discover it short of reading all the deeds
in the record office. Conceding that it is debatable whether such
a deed as B's should be held to give constructive notice, we should
again emphasize the fact that in any pure notice jurisdiction which
has not yet decided the question, such as West Virginia, there is
an equally debatable question whether a title examiner is fulfilling
the duty he owes his client to act with due care and diligence, when
he concerns himself not at all about the possibility of there being
such a deed as B's on record.
Consider next the situation in a notice-race jurisdiction. Here
we run into a strange and surprising anomaly. Remember that
whenever a question of priority as between two conflicting deeds
arises in a notice-race jurisdiction, the subsequent purchaser who
wishes to establish his priority over a grantee under a prior deed
must satisfy two requirements. Not only must he obtain his deed
without notice of the rights of the prior grantee, but even if he
does so, he must place his deed on record before the competing
deed has been recorded. We have already mentioned that with
respect to the first requirement of notice, the problem in a notice-
race jurisdiction is identical to that presented in a pure notice
jurisdiction. It is interesting and surprising to note that most of
the decisions that accept Philbrick's argument, that B's recorded
deed does not give D notice, are from notice-race jurisdictions.
Right here is where the anomaly comes in. Let us concede for a
moment that Philbrick and these minority decisions are correct in
saying that because of the unreasonableness of the search involved,
B's deed though recorded is not constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser from C. It would then necessarily follow that D can
meet the first requirement of a notice-race statute, namely, that he
be a purchaser without notice. It by no means follows, however,
that D has priority over B. As a matter of fact, exactly the opposite
is true because D can never meet the second requirement of a notice-
race statute, that he place his deed on record before B's competing
deed is recorded. D was behind the eight ball to begin with. B
had already won the race for the registry even before D left the
14
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post. Philbrick admits this to be true,16 but fails to go on from
there to what appears to be an inescapable conclusion.
If D is bound to lose his contest for priority simply because
B's deed was first recorded, then in order adequately to protect the
interests of his client, D's lawyer must of necessity make such a
search of the records as will bring B's deed to light, however un-
reasonable and onerous such a search may be. Unless the lawyer
is willing to advise D to proceed upon the assumption that he can
obtain good title from C, an assumption that simply cannot be
true in a notice-race jurisdiction because D can never record before
B, then it is imperative that the lawyer look further in the records
under the name of A as grantor for deeds executed by A before but
recorded after the date on which the deed to C was recorded. If
this were not so, we would in this situation be disregarding the
second requirement of a notice-race statute, thus turning it into
a pure notice statute and nothing more.
We have seen that in a pure race jurisdiction D would always
win because C's deed was recorded first, and that in such a jurisdic-
tion it is never necessary to make any further search of the records
after finding that A's deed to C had been recorded. We have seen
further that under a notice-race statute the further search is im-
perative, wholly without regard to the question of whether B's
later recorded deed is constructive notice to D. It therefore neces-
sarily follows that only in a pure notice jurisdiction is there any
room for argument concerning the necessity of bringing the search
down to date under the name of each grantor who appears in the
chain of title. In such a jurisdiction the answer will depend
entirely upon whether B's recorded deed gives notice to D of B's
rights. On this pure question of record notice, a court might
reasonably decide either way. Attention is again called to the
fact, however, that the majority of courts that have decided the
question hold that B's recorded deed does give notice. This weight
of authority becomes even more imposing if we confine the count
to decisions from pure notice jurisdictions, disregarding those
from notice-race jurisdictions which agree with Philbrick's view.
As we have seen, those decisions as to notice have no relevance on
the point under discussion, namely, the necessity of searching the
16 Philbrick, supra note 15, at 391, where he says: "Since by hypothesis B's
deed is recorded before D's deed is taken, the latter can never satisty a require-
ment of prior recording, and so D must, in a notice-race jurisdiction, alivays
fail."
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record for B's later recorded deed, unless we are incorrect in our
conclusion that such a search is imperative in a notice-race juris-
diction.
It is interesting to observe that in Virginia a few years back the
question of the proper limits of title search was the subject of some
discussion and difference of opinion. The author of a student
note concluded that it was necessary to bring the search down to
date in the case of each grantor.17 A practicing lawyer took the
contrary view in a later note,'8 concluding that the Virginia court
in the case of Bowman v. Holland19 had adopted the minority view
that a subsequently recorded prior deed does not give constructive
notice to a purchaser from the grantee under a previously recorded
deed. Although Philbrick agrees that Virginia has adopted the
minority view,20 there is some doubt whether Bowman v. Holland
actually stands for that proposition, as witness the editorial note2'
at the conclusion of the lawyer's comment.
However that may be, the question of the necessity of bringing
the title search down to date may still be an open one in Virginia
because of some uncertainty as to the nature of the Virginia
recording act. If it is true, as stated by the student editor, that
the act protects only a purchaser without notice "whose conveyance
shall be first duly recorded",22 then of course Virginia is a notice-
race jurisdiction, in which as we have seen above it is imperative
that the title be searched down to date, entirely apart from the
question of notice which is relevant only to the first requirement
of a notice-race statute. An ingenious argument has been made
that although to begin with Virginia had a pure notice statute,
it was turned into a notice-race statute by an amendment that
substituted the words "all purchasers" in place of the former
language "all subsequent purchasers".23 No case was found specifi-
cally holding that the amendment had this effect. Furthermore,
Patton still classifies Virginia as a pure notice jurisdiction. 24  It
would appear then that the limited title search normally made is
adequate only if Virginia is a pure notice jurisdiction, and then
17 Note, 26 VA. L. Rav. 385 (1940).
18 Id. at 831.
19 116 Va. 805, 83 S.E. 393 (1914).
20 Philbrick, supra note 15, at 438.
2126 VA. L. Rav. 835 (1940).
22 Id. at 386.
232 MINOR, REAL PROPERTY § 1312 (2d ed. 1928).
2 4 PATTON, LAND TTL s § 9 n.105.
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol56/iss1/3
LIMITS OF TITLE SEARCH
only if Bowman v. Holland may properly be interpreted as having
adopted the minority view on the question of notice. Until these
doubts are resolved, the only safe course to follow in Virginia
would be to bring the search down to date.
Another situation which is bound to arise as frequently as that
already considered, also raises the question of the necessity of
searching the record down to date under the name of each grantor.
Assume the following set of facts, in which different dates have
been used in order to avoid confusion with the case discussed above:
1945-A by deed of record acquired title in fee.
1946-A conveyed to B who failed to record his deed.
1947-A conveyed to C who had no notice of B's unrecorded
deed.
1948-B recorded his deed.
1949-C recorded his deed.
1950-B conveyed to D who had no actual notice of the deed
to C.
Who has title, D or C? As an aid in answering this question,
consider the transaction step by step. The deed from A to B in
1946 placed legal title in B, but since B failed to record his
deed, this left in A the power to divest B's title by a conveyance to
any subsequent purchaser within the protection of the recording
act. Here again the result depends upon the type of recording
statute involved. The answer is easy in a pure race jurisdiction
and in a notice-race jurisdiction. In order for C to win in either
type of race jurisdiction, he would have to record his deed before
the prior deed to B was recorded. Since this did not happen, B's
title was never divested in such a jurisdiction, and consequently
D got good title when he bought from B in 1950.
The solution becomes more difficult, however, in a pure notice
jurisdiction such as West Virginia. Although the conveyance
from A to B in 1946 placed legal title in B, his failure to record
left in A the power to divest B's title in favor of a subsequent
purchaser without notice. That is exactly what happened when A
conveyed to C in 1947. Therefore in 1947 C had legal title. The
crux of our problem is whether, despite the loss of his title, B
may still place himself in a position to divest C's title by recording
his deed first. Under the cases, it is clear that as between C and B
the recording of B's deed in 1948 in no way affected C's title, so
that when C recorded his deed in 1949 he not only had actual
17
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title but also had title of record. Of course, B's recorded deed is
a cloud on C's title, and in a proper action C may have this cloud
removed from the record. Our court has considered the rights
that may be acquired by a grantee from C. Suppose for a moment
that in 1949 immediately after C recorded his deed, C had conveyed
to X. It is clear that X would have acquired good title from C,
the bona fide purchaser, even though X had actual notice or, as
in this case, constructive notice of the prior deed to B. It is well
settled that once a bona fide purchaser has taken free of prior
equitable or legal rights of which he had no notice, he is able to
transfer that clear title to a subsequent grantee, even though the
grantee has actual or constructive notice of the prior right.2 The
truth of the matter is that all the grantee can have notice of is the
fact that once upon a time B had a right, which has since been cut
off by his grantor's bona fide purchase. Thus in refusing to permit
B to enjoin a sale by C, our court had this to say:
"Mrs. Farkas [C] claims to be an innocent purchaser for
value. At the time of her purchase the title, so far as the
records in the county clerk's office revealed, was in Fay Riddell
[A]. The fact that the 'undated' declaration of trust [in favor
of B] was recorded two days prior to October 22nd, the date
that Mrs. Farkas [C] actually recorded her deed, has no
bearing on the latter's title, if she was an innocent purchaser
for value at the time of the delivery of the deed."26
A contrary holding would clearly have been wrong because it
would have deprived C of the preferred status she acquired when
she became a bona fide purchaser.
Is this situation in any way changed because our set of facts
happens to involve a conveyance by B to D, instead of a conveyance
from C io X? If, before buying from B in 1950, D had employed
you as his lawyer to make an examination of B's title, could you
safely have assured D that B had good title merely because his
deed from A was recorded before C placed his deed on record?
Such advice in this situation would, we have seen, be entirely
correct in either a pure race or a notice-race jurisdiction. The
clear implication from the quoted language of our court, however,
is that West Virginia is a pure notice jurisdiction, the rights of C
261d. at § 15.
20 Cross v. Riddell, 115 W. Va. 686, 638, 177 S.E. 870, 871 (1934).
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being in no way dependent upon a race to the registry with B.
There is then no way that we can give priority to D, the purchaser
from B, unless we say that by recording his deed before C recorded
his own, B somehow or other acquired the power to divest C's title
in favor of D. Such a construction of our statute would not only
turn it into a notice-race statute, at least so far as this situation is
concerned, but we would also have to assume that our court would
hold that D was a purchaser without notice, in spite of the fact
that A's deed to C, representing the true title, was on the record at
the time D bought. Again, it seems too clear for argument that
so long as it remains an open question whether such a recorded
deed gives constructive notice, any lawyer who fails to bring down
to date the search under the name of each grantor, which is the
only way C's deed can be discovered, is taking a chance which in
fairness to his client he ought not to take.
That consideration alone should settle the matter, but the
lawyer should also weigh the possibility that he may come under
personal liability to his client for failure to make a reasonably
careful and diligent search of the record. It is too clear for argu-
ment that a diligent search would bring C's deed to light. It is
no answer to say that this situation will arise so infrequently as
to justify the lawyer in taking this calculated risk. Though willing
to assume the personal risk involved, loyalty to the interests of his
client should preclude any such gamble. Unless and until our
court or the legislature makes it clear that there is no necessity
for making a broader search than is ordinarily made by the prac-
ticing lawyer, Patton's advice, when he was discussing the first
problem posed above, is eminently sound:
"... is a purchaser from C on notice of any rights B may
have as against C? Though some courts hold that he is thus
placed upon inquiry and charged with notice of any facts
which the inquiry would reveal, other courts hold that a
purchaser is under no obligation to search the records for con-
veyances from any particular grantor recorded subsequent to
that from which the purchaser's vendor deraigns title; that
any such subsequently recorded conveyance is outside the
chain of title and does not afford constructive notice. In states
having no decision on the subject, the only safe course for an
examiner is to treat as a cloud on the title any conflicting deed
dated prior to, but recorded after, a deed from the same
grantor appearing in the vendor's chain of title."27
27 PATTON, LAND TTLEs § 46 at 197-198.
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